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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. 
WILLIAM THOMAS DOMINGUEZ, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
App. Ct. No. 20070863-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of DUI, a third-
degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-502 (1953) as amended. The 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the DUI and a no insurance1 charge on 
October 9, 2007. The plea was entered pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct.App.1988), preserving the right to appeal the single issue of this 
appeal. The Defendant was sentenced to a term of 0-5 years at the Utah State 
Prison. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a~3(e). 
The Defendant does not challenge the no insurance conviction. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF 
A BLOOD TEST TAKEN PURSUANT TO A 
TELEPHONIC WARRANT THAT Dlb NOT COMPLY 
WITH RULE 40 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court Ireviews "search and seizure 
issues for correctness", based on an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances. The appellate court applies no deference to the district court's 
legal conclusions. {State v. Naranjo, 118 P.3d 285p 288, (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
and State v. Rynhart, 125 P.3d 938, 941, (Utah 200$)). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: This issue was properly 
preserved for appeal by the timely filing of a motion to suppress and the 
hearing thereon. (R. 17). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons] houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to I 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 40. Search Warrants. See Addendum A. 
be searched, and the 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions 
of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with a violation of one count of DUI, a 
third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-502 (1953) as amended, 
together with several misdemeanors that were resolved by plea negotiation. 
The Defendant filed a timely motion to suppress the toxicology results from 
blood drawn pursuant to a telephonic warrant. After an evidentiary hearing and 
arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to State v. Seiy, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). The Defendant was sentenced on October 9, 2007 to a 
term of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison. The amended Sentence, Judgment 
and Commitment was entered on October 11, 2007. (R. 39) On October 18, 
2007, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. (R. 42). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 3, 2007, Officer Chris Turley pulled over the Defendant for 
DUI. At that time the Defendant refused to take an intoxylizer test. Officer 
Turley then filled out an affidavit and application for a search warrant and 
made telephonic contact with Judge W. Brent West of the Second Judicial 
District Court. (R. 51/2-3) The relevant portions of the affidavit were read to 
Judge West by Officer Turley, who had been placed under oath. Pursuant to 
verbal instruction by Judge West, Officer Turley signed the Judges name to the 
warrant and proceeded to execute the warrant by having medical personnel 
draw the defendant's blood. (R. 51/ 3-6) All parties acknowledge that Judge 
West did not file any documents, recordings or other writing with the clerk. 
The next day the County Attorney filed the affidavit of Officer Turley and the 
Search Warrant signed by Officer Turley for Judge West. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant believes that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a direct result of the search warrant. Rule 40 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the requirements of a telephonic search 
warrant. That rule requires a magistrate, 
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a 
copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or 
other recorded testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall 
within a reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court 
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files with are secured against access by the public. (Rule 40(i)(l) 
emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, the magistrate did nothjng to comply with these 
requirements. Judge West did not record either by electronic media or by 
written notes anything relating to the issuance of the search warrant. Judge 
West did not file anything regarding this search warrant in the court records. 
This failing, therefore, invalidates the search warrant; and, therefore, any 
evidence obtained in reliance on the search warrant should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF 
A BLOOD TEST TAKEN PURSUANT TO A 
TELEPHONIC WARRANT THAT DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH RULE 40 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
provides in relevant part: "The right of the people \o be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated" The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a 
seizure is unreasonable. Additionally, the State of Utah has codified certain 
rules in an effort to implement these constitutional guarantees. One of these 
statutes is Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The relevant 
portion of that statute states: 
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At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a 
copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or 
other recorded testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall 
within a reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court 
files with are secured against access by the public. (Rule 40(i)(l) 
emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, the magistrate failed to retain, seal, or file any of the 
requisite documents or recordings as set forth in this rule. The trial court in this 
case, recognized that failing; however, declined to impose any sanctions for 
that violation. 
Although the Utah Appellate Courts have not specifically addressed the 
issue of a violation of the telephonic search warrant issues as applicable to this 
particular case, there is some guidance regarding the importance of following 
certain procedures in recording or filing search warrant. In the case of 
Anderson v, Taylor, 2006 UT 79,^26 149 P.3d 352, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the failure of the Fourth District Court to appropriately file and make j> 
available search warrants and affidavits. In that case the Court, recognizing the 
The defendant is aware of one case, U.S. v. Larson 63 Fed.Appx. 416, *422, 
2003 WL 723961, **5 (C.A.10 (Utah (C.A. 10 (Utah),2003) which is a 
unpublished decision wherein the 10th circuit stated that under federal law, 
technical violations of the recording requirements of a telephonic search 
warrant did not rise to the level of requiring suppression. Additionally there is 
a recent Seventh Circuit opinion likewise interpreting the federal rules 
differently than state rules. (See U.S. v. Cazares-Olivas 2008 WL 220689, *3 
(C.A.7 (Wis. (C.A.7 (Wis.),2008) 
7 
ex parte nature of these types of proceedings together with the constitutional 
implications, stated, 
Utah statutes governing the issuance of search warrants 
contemplate that the issuing court will maintain reliable records 
of the warrants and the documents supporting them. We 
accordingly grant in part Anderson's petition for extraordinary 
writ and call upon our supervisory power oyer the courts of this 
state to require that they retain copies of all warrants issued and 
the documents supporting the requests for su^h warrants. 
In the present case the trial court failed to follow the statutory mandates 
regarding the issuance of a search warrant and the preservation of necessary 
records memorializing such an issuance. 
Various courts from other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues 
involving the issuance of telephonic search warrants. In the case of United 
States v. Shorter, 600 F2d 585 (1979, CA6 Ohib), the Court held that the 
failure of a federal magistrate to properly administer an oath before receiving 
information on a telephonic search warrant required suppression of the 
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Similarly, in the case of Bowyer v. 
Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 37 Cal App 3d 151 (1974, 1st Dist) the 
court held that narcotics seized by police pursuant to a telephonic search 
warrant should be suppressed where the warrant w^s invalid because it had not 
been placed in writing in any form in contravention 0f California state laws. 
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In the case of State v. Boniface, 546 P.2d 843, (Arizona 1976), the 
reviewing court ruled that a warrant was invalid where the statement of an 
officer had not been taken under oath nor recorded by the magistrate as 
required by law. Furthermore, in the case of State v. Cook, 498 N.W. 2d 17, 20 
(Minn. 1993), the court held, "serious violations which subvert the purpose of 
established procedure will justify suppression." In that case, which is 
strikingly similar to the case at bar, the court suppressed evidence seized 
pursuant to the telephonic search warrant due to statutory violations by the 
magistrate regarding the recordation of the call used to obtain a search warrant. 
According to Minnesota law, the entire call from which a search warrant is 
issued must be recorded "either by a voice recording, stenography, or 
longhand" (Id. at 19-20) 
Likewise, in the case of State v. Reep, 167 P.3d 1156, 1162 (Wash. 
2007), the Court reversed a conviction and suppressed evidence obtained from 
a search warrant where the officer properly wrote out the script for his 
telephonic application, but the magistrate failed to make a recording of that 
conversation, and had no recollection of the conversation thereby making 
appellate review impossible. 
In the case of Volz v. State 773 N.E. 2d 894 (Ind. App. 2002), the court 
suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant where 
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the officer failed to make a complete recording of |the conversation as required 
by statute. According that case further rejected tljie State's argument that the 
good-faith exception should apply. 
The State may argue that a good-faith exception should apply or that the 
suppression of evidence is unduly harsh for what (seems to be a minor failure 
by the issuing magistrate. Minor failings, however, can result in significant 
and permanent ramifications in all areas of law. For instance, if a criminal 
defendant fails to file a notice of appeal until 31 days after the entry of the 
judgment, he is barred from proceeding on an appeal. In a juvenile court 
setting, if a parent fails to sign a notice of appeal of a judgment terminating her 
parental rights (which has been signed by her counsel), she is barred from 
proceeding on an appeal of that very significant an$ permanent loss. Similarly, 
one day may make the difference between wheth0r a case may be filed or is 
barred by statute of limitations, one day may m^ke the difference between 
whether requests for admissions in the civil realm $re deemed admitted or can 
be answered in denied. Furthermore, five inche$ may make the difference 
between whether a distribution of controlled substance is deemed a first-degree 
felony (within 1000 feet of a drug free zone) or a (second-degree felony. The 
examples are almost endless. Due process and equal protection should 
mandate that if a criminal defendant can be incarcdrated for minor differences 
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or violations, the very court which incarcerates the individual should be 
required to strictly follow codified law with regards to the issuance of 
telephonic search warrants. 
The state cannot argue that the error was harmless on the grounds that 
the officer would have had exigent circumstances which would have allowed 
the blood draw without a warrant. This is contradicted on two grounds. First 
the officer obviously did not believe that the circumstances were exigent 
enough to allow a warrantless search; otherwise he would not have requested 
the warrant. Secondly, the court in State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^ f 31, 156 
P3d. 771 has held, "the evanescence of blood-alcohol was never special 
enough to create an exigent circumstance of itself" 
Once this Court has established that there was a statutory or 
constitutionally impermissible search and seizure of the Defendant's blood, 
State and Federal caselaw require the suppression of the tainted evidence. In 
the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated, "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from 
trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of 
an unlawful invasion." The Court further reinforced the gravity of Fourth 
Amendment protections in the home by stating, 
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional 
guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, 
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Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, this Cckirt held nearly half a 
century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could 
not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383. The exclusionary prohibition extends 
as well to the indirect as the direct produqts of such invasions. 
(Wong Sun v. United States, at 484). 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed th0 fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 
1998) this Court held: 
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule Mapp requires us to 
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the Constitution." Mapp, 367 US. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 
1691. There is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie 
Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there 
any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence 
obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be suppressed as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 
471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officers impermissibly 
seized the Defendant's blood when they relied on a search warrant that was 
improperly issued by the magistrate. The magistrate did not record the 
conversation by electronic or written means. The judge did not file any 
document, recording or other evidence of the issuance of the search warrant. 
These requirements are statutory, and the failing to| follow the statute violated 
the Defendant's due process constitutional rights. Once that seizure occurred, 
any evidence obtained should be suppressed as a violation of the Defendant's 
constitutional rights under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In the 
12 
present case, that suppression should include all evidence obtained from a 
subsequent blood draw from the Defendant. This evidence obtained by the 
improper issuance of the warrant would therefore constitute fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial courts decision denying the Defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence on the grounds of an illegal search and jsemjre. 
/ 
DATED this 25th day of February 2008. 
)ALLW\RICHARUS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Ryan Tenney, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 
300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, JJtah 84114-0180, 
postage prepaid this 25l day of February 2008 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
14 
Rule 40* Search Warrants 
(a) Definitions. 
As used in this rule: 
(a)(l)"Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m. local 
time. 
(a)(2)"Recorded "or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony, a 
return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other replication 
that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same effect as the 
original. 
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the state 
and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, or 
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized and includes an 
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other 
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to have the same effect as 
the original. 
(b) Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or 
conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
(c) Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in the 
possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the 
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, 
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought 
by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the magistrate 
shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford protection of 
the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence: 
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business; 
(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential sources 
of information; or 
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints oi|i constitutionally protected 
rights. 
(d) Search warrant served in readable form. 
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readabje form upon the person or 
place to be searched. 
(e) Time for service — Officer may request assistance. 
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the wartant that it be served in the 
daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to 
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to its being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case the 
magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any tiifte of the day or night. 
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of issuance. 
Any search warrant not executed within this time styall be void and shall be 
returned to the court or magistrate as not executed. 
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search. 
(f) Receipt for property taken. 
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search Warrant, shall give a receipt 
to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no 
person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in thp place where the property 
was found. 
(g) Return — Inventory of property taken. 
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return of 
the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded 
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is) being held. 
(h) Safekeeping of property. 
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible] for its safekeeping and 
maintenance until the court otherwise orders. 
(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies - Documents sealed for twenty days -
Forwarding of record to court with jurisdiction. 
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the 
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on 
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed 
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those 
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the 
warrant unless that time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed search 
warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the public. 
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by: 
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and filing 
the sealed envelope in a court file not available to the public; 
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other means under the control of 
the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the 
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in 
which they are sealed; or 
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the State 
of Utah which system is designed to transmit accurate copies of the documents to 
the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after issuance of the 
warrant by the magistrate. 
(j) Findings required for service without notice.If the magistrate finds upon proof, 
under oath, that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given, the 
magistrate may direct that the officer need not give notice of authority and purpose 
before entering the premises to be searched. 
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinances — 
Warrant to obtain evidence. 
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a showing of 
probable cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, has been 
violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be 
obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or 
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a 
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed to 
any peace officer within the county where the warrant is to be executed, who shall 
serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer. 
(1) Remotely communicated search warrants. 
(1)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable Under the circumstances, a 
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who is 
not in the physical presence of the magistrate, providea the magistrate is satisfied 
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All communication 
between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting attorney requesting the 
warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, 
those, or by other means. 
text, or any combination of 
(1)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony toon which the magistrate 
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The testimony 
and content of the warrant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by writing or by 
mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage <br by other means. 
(1)(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the magistrate 
shall issue a search warrant. 
(1)(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace officer 
or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a (remote location to sign the 
magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location. 
(1)(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony shall be 
retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be by 
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other 
means. 
(1)(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m) of 
this rule, any person having standing may request ana shall be provided with a 
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of 
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable 
form. 
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Document^ 
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A 
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application 
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a 
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may order the following document? to be sealed: 
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants; 
(m)(l)(B) search warrants; 
(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant is 
based; 
(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for 
sealing the documents. 
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are public 
record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public file if 
all or part of the information in them would: 
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety; 
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's reputation 
or privacy; or 
(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation. 
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not available to the public. If a 
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document 
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public file and an un-redacted 
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document 
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is 
accompanied by a court order sealing the document. 
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion to 
unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law 
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an 
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the court may hold a hearing on 
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed, 
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the 
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documents to be delivered to a 
designated person without unsealing the documents and require the person 
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to any other person without 
the authorization of the court. 
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may remain 
sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that the records should be unsealed. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
WILLIAM THOMAS DOMINGUEZ, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES OCT 1 I 200? 
PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071901654 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: October 9, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 20, 1982 
Video 
Tape Number: 3C100907 Tape Count: 232-237 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2007 Guilty 
4. NO PROOF OF INSURANCE - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for plea. Defendant is present in custody 
from the Utah State Prison. Defendant is represented by Martin 
Gravis. Negotiations have been reached. 
The State moves to dismiss counts 2, 3 and 5. Court grants. 
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a full Rule 11 
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court. 
The Court advises defendant of rights. Defendant enters a plea of 
guilty as charged to counts 1 and 4. 
The Court accepts plea, finds that it is knowingly and voluntarily 
Page 1 
Case No: 071901654 
Date: Oct 09, 2007 
given and there is a factual basis for the charge. The defendant 
waives time for sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court orders sentence imposed on each count to run concurrent 
with each other but consecutive to sentence defendant is currently 
serving. Jail sentence shall be served at the Utah State Prison. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of NO PROOF OF INSURANCE a 
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 
day(s) 
Dated this day of QC1" ) / ^l07 ^ 2 0 
PAMELA <#? ^ FFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
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THE COURT: Okay. This is State of Utah versus 
William Dominguez, 071901654. Go ahead, Mr. Shaw. 
MR. SHAW: We call Trooper Turley to the stand. 
CHRIS TURLEY, 
being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAW: 
Q. Trooper, please state your full name and occupation. 
A. Chris Turley. I!m a state trooper with the Utah 
Highway Patrol. 
Q. And how long have you been so employed? 
A. Umm, a little over two years now. 
Q, Did you have occasion to come into contact with the 
defendant, William Thomas Dominguez, on June 3rd of 2007? 
MR. GRAVIS: We'll stipulate to that, Your Honor. 
We'll stipulate that he arrested him for a DUI. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: I don't think we need to go through all 
that. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. We'll get right to the issue of 
the search warrant. There came a time during the course of 
the arrest where Mr. Dominguez refused to take an intoxylizer 
test, or other chemical test; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
2 
Q, And what did you do in response 
At that time I wrote a search warrant. I contacted 
Judge West by .telephone, 
£ jid when you say you wrote a search warrant, did you 
write the warrant prior to contacting -- an affidavit for the 
1warrant prior to contacting Judge West? 
A. That's correct. 
Q, And where did you do that? 
A. At my office. 
C he defendant, then, was still with you and 
present at the time you were preparing the warrar. • :).r 
affidavit for warrant? 
A. Yes. He was under supervision a* -1 • "- • , 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, we have suppose there'L 
a stipulation that the affidavit is acci irate as reflected j :i. 
the memorandum? 
MR. GRAVIS:. I stipulate that t-hat's the affidavit 
'. e officer prepared, but not that that's what was told to 
Judge West. 
Bil, SHAW; Okay . That! s fine . 
fc. (Bl MR. SHAW) So you prepared an affidavit and you 
contacted Judge West telephonically? 
Correct. 
Tell us about the telephone conversation. What did 
you inform Judge West of during 4L Ul-phone conversation? 
o 
A. I informed him of the subject's name, the reason for 
the stop, all of the clues I observed as far as his red blood 
shot eyes, the smell of the odor of alcohol, the subject!s 
unwillingness to submit to a chemical test. 
Q. Do you have a copy of the affidavit for search 
warrant? 
A. I do. 
Q. Look at that with me, if you will. Let's just go 
through it if we night for a moment line item by line item. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, we'll submit that the 
affidavit can be entered so we don't have to go through all 
of it. If the state wants to submit the affidavit, it speaks 
for itself. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: At least the alleged affidavit, let's 
make it that way. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. That's fine. 
Q. (BY MR. SHAW) What I'm getting at, trooper, is did 
you in fact read part or all of this affidavit to Judge West 
while you had him on the telephone? 
A. Umm, I did not read him every line of this affidavit. 
I stated the facts to him. I did state all of the facts that 
23 I are in this affidavit as far as the reason for the stop, the 
2 4 reason for wanting to obtain a warrant. 
25 Q. Are you able, looking at the affidavit, to tell us 
4 
] 
2 
3 
A 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
14 
21 
2° 
23 
2/1 
2 5 
v1 lat if any, part of the affidavit was read specifically to 
the judge on the telephone? 
A. Umm, I read him the reason for the stop, which is oh 
l.he first page at the bottom. 
Q. Starting with on June 3rd, 2007, at approximately 
1:02 ] lours? 
A Correct. 
Q 
A Continuing all the way through where I requested 
iorainguez's blood to a portable blood tester and he refused. 
I also informed him that Dominguez had at least four prior 
?ictions in the past ten years. And that he was on 
parole for a felony DUI conviction. 
Q, l,u) , And then, prior to you reading that portion of 
::he affidavit or going through that information with Judge 
we---1 were you placed under oath by Judge West? 
A. I was. 
Q. Okay. And at the conclusion of the affidavit, or at 
least your statement to the judge, which included part of the 
affidavit, what did Judge West direct you to do? 
A. Umm, he advised me to affix a signature to the 
affidavit. 
Q. And was that done in accordance with the judge's 
order at 0227 hours? 
A. It was. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay. And then did you sign the affidavit prior to 
Judge West directing you to sign his name? 
A. I did not. 
Q. When did you sign the affidavit? 
A. When he told me to. 
Q. Okay. That's what I'm saying, when he told you to 
sign it you went ahead and signed the affidavit? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. In its current form? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then looking at the search warrant, did you also 
affix Judge West's name to that search warrant at 0227•hours? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. And then ultimately there is a return on the 
warrant wherein you returned the warrant. And it was 
subsequently signed, it looks like, June 4th, 2007, by Judge 
Jones? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Was there any other attempt to make a record of the 
telephone conference 
this entire process? 
A. No. 
MS. HUGIE: 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
between yourself and Judge West during 
Okay. That's all. 
I have no questions. 
You may step down. Thank you. Any 
1 
6 
1 further witnesses? 
2 1 No, that's all the witnesses we have. 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead if you want to argue, i \ . 
4 I rour Honor, I think the argument that we 
5 . nade is straightforward in the memorandum. Rule 40(1) 
i :.-.:.• i.it modified the previous statute as I read it and 
7 defines recording to include a written record of the 
8 conversation. Trooper Turley has a written record that was 
9 prepared simultaneously with his conversation with Ji ldge 
1C AJest. Mr'"' ,", testified that he under oath stated those facts 
11 contained in that affidavit to Judge West. Judge West 
1? \lirec Led hint, upon the conclusion of that, to sign his name 
13 1 to the warrant. That warrant was then issued. 
I want to be specific about this, because I think rule 
15 40(a) (2) defines recorded or recording as including Lln< 
16 "recording of testimony, a return or other communication or 
17 any copy, printout, facsimile, or other replica": is 
IP atended by the person making the recording to have the same 
effect as the original." It's a written document Trooper 
20 Turl ey followed that document during his conversation. 
21 Then, if you look at rule 40(1) (2), the recording M" 
22 testimony is sufficient if in written form. That's what the 
23 affidavit is. It was substantially complied with :i n 
24 accordance with rule 40 and we think it's a valid warrant. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead. 
7 
1 MR. GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, I agree that rule 40 
2 has replaced the statute, but the state is skipping over rule 
3 i (1), which says that --
4 THE COURT: Let me get it out. Hold on a second. 
5 I (Pause in the proceedings.) 
6 THE COURT: And you were looking at what? 
7 MR. GRAVIS: 40(i)(l). 
8 THE COURT: You know, I guess I have my 2007 book in 
9 my office. I thought I had one out here, but I donf t seem 
10 to. Why don!t you read it to me. 
11 MR. GRAVIS: "At the time of issuance, the 
12 magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the search 
13 warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded 
14 testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall, within a 
15 reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court files 
16 which are secured against access by the public. Those 
17 J documents shall remain sealed until 20 days following the 
18 issuance of the warrant unless that time is extended or 
19 reduced under section M. Unsealed search warrant documents 
20 shall be filed in the court record available to the public." 
21 So I submit that rule (i)(1) requires that that record be 
22 prepared by the magistrate, not by the officer. There1s no 
23 evidence that any recording of the testimony of the officer 
24 was made by the magistrate. When we tried to obtain a copy 
25 there was nothing there. There was no signed copy of the 
search warrant, there's no signed --
""f'lil". 'VO'lCRT i There's nothing on file here? 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing on file other thaji what the 
4
 ite has already filed,- which is the warrant signed by the 
officer with Judge West!s signature and the affidavit that he 
prepared wi t h i In- officer --
THE COURT: So what!s your primary complaint about 
';hi s exactly? 
MR. GRAVIS: There's no affidavit. There's no ^a^+s 
tagistrate can base a search warrant on because 
there's no record of that conversation between the officer 
irnl JuJi-ic 'w^-st that is required to be made by the magistrate, 
not by the officer. 
THE COURT: What's required to be made? 
MR. GRAVIS: The record. 
1 . Let's say he came in and brought 
a copy of the affidavit in on Monday, or the next ntnrnirg, 
whatever the next business days was, do you think that's 
sufficient? 
F i N:>. It says at the time of issuance. 
It clearly says at the time of issuance the magistrate shall, 
Mot may, shall. So the magistrate has to do that at the time 
of the issuance of the telephonic warrant or any other 
.::ant, he's got to make a signed copy and a copy of the 
affidavit. If there's no affidavit it says or other recorded 
testimony. 
warrant. 
THE 
complaint th 
MR. 
THE 
what you're 
MR. 
evidence to 
is required 
But it's 
COURT: 
Lat he di 
GRAVIS: 
, COURT: 
at the time of the issuance of the 
I guess I'm wondering, is it your J 
dn't read verbatim 
No. My point is 
I'm just trying to 
complaining about. 
GRAVIS: 
base the 
Our complaint 
search warrant 
is 
on. 
under the statute has to be 
magistrate and itTs not done here. So 
the affidavit? 
— 
understand exactly 
that there's no 
The recording which 
) made by the 
we have -- we don't 
know what he told the magistrate because, I submit, the work 
product is not good enough. The law requires that the 
magistrate make the recording, not the officer. I have a 
copy of the rule right here in front of me. 
THE COURT: So in other words if he had faxed a copy 
of this to him or e-mailed it to him? 
MR. GRAVIS: That might be good enough so the 
magistrate could file that at the time of the issuance of the 
warrant or have a copy, but he didn't. There's nothing here 
that Judge West retained a copy of any conversation, or even 
a copy of the warrant, which the rule specifically requires. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond? 
MR. SHAW: Yeah. I think 40 (i) and 40(1) are 
mutually exclusive given the change in the law and statute. 
10 
40(1) was designed for this very purpose of obtaining remote 
warrants and not require the kind of thing that Mr. Gravis is 
suggesting we have to do. 
4 | The important part. ! .. was Officer Turley sworn under oath 
5 | and did he testify accurately as part of that oath and 
( I affirmation to obtain the warrant? I don't read 40 (i) - - I 
7 I don't have a copy with me, but I don't read 40 (i) as negating 
he content of 40(1), which is very specific about remote 
warrants. 
1 0 I '. Ml-1 MfAV I rl I , i ibJiu I. - -
11 I THE COURT: I'm going to take i t under advisement. 
1 2 | ' MI I GRA \ > IS Okay. 
THE COURT: I'll get you a decision when I get it 
1 L "::: . I n t h. e m e a n 11 in e, I guess we'll leave the trial date 
j set where it's at. I assume the state will proceed on tria] 
16 .-._, regardless of the warrant, or the affidavit or the 
17 test results, the blood sample? 
18 i* ,.>iihA,W: 'Yeah. It may change our prospects for 
19 negotiations, though, Your Honor. It could negate the trial 
2 0 date. 
21- THE COURT: All right. I'll do my best to get a 
22 decision out tc> you. I have other things on the table also. 
23 MR. GRAVIS: We have a pretrial scheduled hi two 
2 4 weeks. 
25 THE COURT should have it by then. 
11 
MR. SHAW: Does it show a nonjury trial setting? 
THE COURT: No, a jury setting.- All right. Thank 
you. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, I received a telephone call 
from the toxicologist who will be out of the country from 
October 1st through October 19th, which is right when this 
trial is set. I would ask that we strike that date. 
MR. GRAVIS: Just leave it until the pretrial and 
see what happens. I don't have any problem if we strike the 
trial date at the time of the pretrial. 
MR. SHAW: Should we strike the trial and set it for 
a review pending your decision? 
MR. GRAVIS: I'd like to leave it where it is. If 
we win and they want to proceed to trial, I don't want to 
have to wait for a new trial date. They won't need the 
toxicologist --
MR. SHAW: If in fact we lose we won't need the 
toxicologist. 
THE COURT: I've got another jury trial starting 
that Wednesday with another person named Dominguez. I don't 
know who it is, but it's obviously not this person. But it 
may be bumped anyway. Let's just leave it alone for now and 
I'll get a decision out. Thanks. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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